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A Member of No Community? Theology after Wittgenstein 
Brad J. Kallenberg 
 
Wittgenstein studies has spawned a new sort of Christian theology. A growing list of 
theologians have discovered in Wittgenstein a therapy for conceptual confusion and tips 
for how to go on, not only in religious faith and practice, but also in the practice of 
theology as an academic discipline.1 This is not to say that such thinkers have succeeded 
in turning Wittgenstein into an instrument of apologetics or that Wittgenstein has 
“delivered” them from the grip of their own religious particularity. No; they have learned 
                                                 
1
 See Fergus Kerr, “The Reception of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy by Theologians,” in Religion and 
Wittgenstein’s Legacy, ed. D. Z. Phillips and Mario von der Ruhr (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2005), 253-72. The more recent notables include Kerr’s own Theology after Wittgenstein (Oxford, UK: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986). Garth L. Hallett, Identity and Mystery in Themes of Christian Faith; Late-Wittgensteinian 
Perspectives (Hampshire, UK & Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2005). Also of note are various essayists in Jeffrey 
Stout and Robert MacSwain, eds., Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein 
(London: SCM Press, 2004). To these must be added the classic works by Herbert McCabe, Paul Holmer, 
David Burrell and Staley Hauerwas. See Herbert McCabe, Law, Love and Language (New York: Continuum, 
2004).  See also, Paul Holmer, “Wittgenstein and Theology,” in New Essays on Religious Language, ed. 
Dallas M. High (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1969), 25-35.; The Grammar of Faith (San Francisco, 
CA: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978). And see David Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973). Perhaps most prolific of all Christian theologians who write under 
the influence of Wittgenstein is Stanley Hauerwas. For my analysis of Hauerwas’s use of Wittgenstein, see 
Brad J. Kallenberg, Ethics as Grammar: Changing the Postmodern Subject (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2001). 
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from Wittgenstein the skill of silence. Their theology, like Wittgenstein’s philosophy, 
comes to a full stop. 
What this full stop amounts to, of course, is a matter of discussion. D. Z. Phillips has 
described “contemplative philosophy” as culminating in a “radical pluralism.”2 In this 
essay, I will argue that  the radical pluralism that is said to follow from contemplative 
philosophy is so radical that the presumed “boundary” between philosophy and theology 
is once more conceived as semi-permeable, a feature that lets back to the table at least a 
few theologians. 
 
CONTEMPLATIVE PHILOSOPHY  
DZ Phillips describes “contemplative philosophy” as operating in the middle of a 
spectrum between two extremes.3 On the side of the “too hot,” Phillips includes all 
attempts by passionate thinkers to employ philosophy as an aid for figuring out such 
puzzles as “the real nature of truth” or as a guide for advising people “how to live well.” In 
the end, passionate ideologues end up constructing totalizing systems. In contrast to this 
sort of “positive” philosophy, contemplative philosophy seeks to “do conceptual justice by 
the world in all its variety.”4 
                                                 
2
 See D. Z. Phillips, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). See also his essay reprinted as “On Wittgenstein,” Philosophical Investigations 24, 
no. 2 (2001): 147-53. 
3
 “Locating Philosophy’s Cool Place: A Reply to Stephen Mulhall,” in D.Z. Phillips’ Contemplative 
Philosophy of Religion, ed. Andy F. Sanders (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 29-54. 
4
 Opening paragraph of “Radical Pluralism,” in Festschrift..... ed. Brian Birch (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, forthcoming). page #?? 
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On the side of “too cold” are those who insist that philosophy’s sole task is a 
negative one, the clearing up of conceptual confusions in others’ work. Such a task will 
inevitably keep the philosopher busy, since there is such an abundance of grammatical 
confusion and misuse of language that needs sorting out.5 But Phillips resists the 
suggestion that this is all philosophy can be about. In contrast to “negative” philosophy, 
contemplative philosophy has more to do than clear away the underbrush. For in addition 
to conceptual clarification, contemplative philosophy is also constituted by its central 
concern regarding the riddle of the very possibility of discourse. 
Contemplative philosophy, then, occupies the middle ground. The character of this 
middle ground has been variously described in terms of “disinterest,” “neutrality” and 
“coolness.”6 At stake for my argument is whether theologians are necessarily excluded 
from the practice of contemplative philosophy, or from the radical pluralism this coolness 
is said to entail.  
                                                 
5
 For examples of Phillips’s own “interventionist” style of philosophy see the essays in Interventions in 
Ethics (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992). See also Wittgenstein and Religion (London, 
UK: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 
6
 See Stephen Mulhall, “Wittgenstein’s Temple: Three Styles of Philosophical Architecture,” in D.Z. 
Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion, ed. Andy F. Sanders (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2007), 13-27; D. Z. Phillips, Philosophy’s Cool Place (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); 
Mario von der Ruhr, “Philosophy, Theology and Heresy: D. Z. Phillips and the Grammar of Religious Belief,” 
in D.Z. Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion, ed. Andy F. Sanders (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2007), 111-24..  
I must raise a minor worry I have over von der Rurh’s image of contemplative philosophy as 
“disinterested,” as “disinterest” is all too easily mistaken for the vantage point assumed by a Cartesian 
spectator. While von de Ruhr is surely right to see contemplative philosophy at a distance from “partisan 
apologetics,” he uncarefully asserts that contemplative philosophy’s “proper task is attentive and 
disinterested description” (59). If one is entirely disinterested, why would one bother to begin? Elsewhere 
Phillips has shown that criteria for description are context dependent—think of someone who, while 
observing an act of mugging, gives the play-by-play in monotone medical-ese rather than reflexively 
shouting for help. Such dispassionate action would be neither praiseworthy nor contemplative. It would be 
subhuman. See the delightful essays in D. Z. Phillips, Introducing Philosophy: The Challenge of Scepticism 
(Oxford, UK & Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). 
4 
To be sure, historians of philosophy have habitually described philosophy as 
bifurcated from theology. And many Wittgensteinians have followed suit. This can be felt 
in the strong temptation to read Zettel §455 proscriptively. 
 (Der Philosoph ist nicht Bürger einer Denkgemeinde. Das ist, was ihn zum 
Philosophen macht.) 
(The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what 
makes him into a philosopher.) 
Stephen Mulhall paraphrases the German this way: “that a philosopher should not be a 
citizen of a community of ideas.”7 In favor of a proscriptive reading is Wittgenstein’s own 
characterization of logician Frank Ramsey as a “bourgeois” (bürgerlich) thinker. 
Wittgenstein went on to complain that 
he [Ramsey] thought with the aim of clearing up the affairs of some particular 
community [Gemeinde; municipality]. He did not reflect on the essence of the 
state (Staat)…but on how this state might be reasonably organized. The idea 
that this state might not be the only possible one in part disquieted him and in 
part bored him. He wanted to get down as quickly as possible to reflecting on 
the foundation—of this state. This was what he was good at…whereas real 
philosophical reflection disturbed him….8 
Wittgenstein apparently thought Ramsey was mistaken to be so grounded in the affairs of 
“some particular community.” Yet there is another way to read §455. If “bourgeois”  
translates bürgerlich, surely Wittgenstein used the cognate Bürger (“citizen”) in §455 for 
the way it conjures images of clubby, upper-class merchants.9 The upshot? Wittgenstein 
knew that his sort of philosophy made him a de facto outsider to the Cambridge 
                                                 
7
 Mulhall, “Wittgenstein’s Temple: Three Styles of Philosophical Architecture,” 21. Emphasis added. 
8
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. Peter 
Winch, English translation with the amended 2nd. ed. (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 17e. 
9
 Thanks to Terry Tilley for this insight. 
5 
“Philosophers’ Club.” Taken in this way, Z§455 may simply be a self-description, a 
repetition of the maxim: a prophet is never welcomed by the hometown crowd.10 
There is evidence that Wittgenstein perceived himself in countercultural terms; he 
perceived himself as living in a kind of self-imposed “exile” from culture at large.11 Recall 
that Wittgenstein once remarked to Drury, “My type of thinking is not wanted in this 
present age, I have to swim so strongly against the tide. Perhaps in a hundred years 
people will really want what I am writing.”12 In the meantime, Wittgenstein himself wrote 
for a particular community: 
If I say that my book is meant for only a small circle of people (if it can be 
called a circle), I do not mean that I believe this circle to be the élite of 
mankind; but it does comprise those to whom I turn (not because they are 
better or worse than others but) beck they form my cultural milieu, my fellow 
citizens as it were [gleichsam die Menschen meines Vaterlandes], in contrast to 
the rest who are foreign [fremd] to me.13 
The question remains, did Wittgenstein intend the parenthetical remark (Z§455) as 
anything more than self-description? Must the Zettel text be read proscriptively? 
In what follows, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s remark in Zettel need not be taken 
as proscriptive advice to would-be contemplative philosophers for two reasons. First, 
contemplative philosophy is itself a human craft and as such is constituted by overlapping 
                                                 
10
 “Prophets are not without honor, except in their hometown, and among their own kin, and in their 
own house.” Mark 6:4, NRSV. 
11
 James C. Klagge, “Wittgenstein in Exile,” in Religion and Wittgenstein’s Legacy, ed. D.Z. Phillips and 
Mario von der Ruhr (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005). 
12
 M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” in Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 91-189. Citation from 73. Klagge observes that in Wittgenstein’s 
mind the previous hundred years, at least since Schumann’s death in 1856, marked the beginning of the end 
of Western culture as per Oswald Spengler’s vision. Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang Des Abendlandes: 
Umrisse Einer Morphologie Der Weltgeschichte (Munich: Beck, 1922-23). These volumes were translated into 
English by Charles Francis Atkinson and published by Alfred Knopf in 1926-28. 
13
 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 10e. 
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modes of discourse with the result that the dividing line between one craft and another 
passes through the hearts of human speakers. Consequently, the intention to surrender 
membership in communities of discourse in the name of contemplative philosophy may 
prove to be as wrongheaded as the quest for “objectivity” proved to be in former times. 
Second, the grammar of “theology” does not admit the sort of definitional precision 
needed for either Zettel §455 or Phillips’s statement to function as a universal prohibition. 
I will take up each of these in turn. 
 
CONTEMPLATIVE PHILOSOPHY AS A CRAFT 
The word “craft” may raise images of Aristotelian poēsis and the related notions of 
technē and “technique.” For Aristotle, making shoes was a craft. But I do not use the term 
in this sense. By the term “craft” I mean those complex, cooperative enterprises—such as 
medicine, engineering, mathematics, music—for which standards of excellence (against 
which novices are measured for progress) are internal to the activities of the craft itself 
and are embodied by the behavior (both in the sense of tacit skills of judgment and 
discourse) of the expert practitioners.14 Just as the standards of excellence may be read off 
the play of the craft yet never be codified successfully (much less completely), so too 
crafts can never be reduced to domains of information. The skilled musician knows when 
                                                 
14
 It should be evident that I have been deeply formed by theological reflection on the family 
resemblance between Alasdair MacIntyre’s seminal vocabulary and ancient Christian notions such as 
“discipleship.” See James Wm. McClendon, Jr., Ethics: Systematic Theology, Volume I (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 1986), esp. ch. 6. His torturous definition of “practice” can be found in Alasdair MacIntyre, 
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 187. 
7 
the bass is “too heavy,” though will be unable to describe this in advance (much less to 
non-musicians).15 
Philosophy, especially as Wittgenstein practiced it, shares important characteristics 
with other crafts. Chief among these features for my argument is the developmental 
nature of the craft. Practitioners who try hard in the right way tend to improve in their 
craft-relevant skills, albeit slowly over a long time. Wittgenstein viewed his craft as 
necessarily involving “work on oneself,”16 and even near life’s end he worked hard to 
shape and reshape his thinking in various ways. Wittgenstein’s students saw this and 
tried to keep up. It almost goes without saying that Wittgenstein’s students, even the 
ones who understood him poorly, instinctively responded to him as good novices respond 
to any master in whose presence there is the best hope of one’s own progress. The means 
of progress in this case was direct contact with Wittgenstein as mentor. In addition to 
group discussion, a privileged few carried on private conversations with Wittgenstein. 
And when they were not in group or private tutorials, they painstakingly wrote down 
verbatim everything they could possibly remember, put it in order, and published 
memoirs that reproduced Wittgenstein’s words. Think of conversations transcribed by 
Friedrich Waismann and Maurice O’C. Drury, of Norman Malcolm’s memoirs, Rush 
Rhees’s recollections, the compiling, editing and translating of Georg von Wright and 
Elizabeth Anscombe, the class notes of Alice Ambrose, Cyril Barrett, G.E. Moore, and 
                                                 
15
 This illustration is Wittgenstein’s own. G.E. Moore, “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930–33,” in 
Philosophical Occasions, 1912–1952, ed. James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Indianapolis & Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing, 1993), 46-117. Citation from 05. 
16
 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 24e. 
8 
others. If we are honest, we have to admit that for all of these “disciples,” the words of 
Wittgenstein function as canonical in general and, in particular, tips for their personal 
growth in the craft.17 
Of course, a savvy reader is understandably leery of student notes. After all, their 
quality is so very uneven. Fergus Kerr observed that student notes for the Cambridge 
Lectures of 1946-47 taken by P. T. Geach, K. J. Shah and A. C. Jackson are so dissimilar 
from one another that it almost appears as if these students were attending different 
seminars!18 Wittgenstein was aware of this unevenness and lamented to Drury, “If you 
write these spontaneous remarks down, someday someone may publish them as my 
considered opinions. I don’t want that done.  For I am talking now freely as my ideas 
come, but all this will need a lot more thought and better expression.” (Drury goes on to 
comment parenthetically, “This indeed is what was done later in the volume called 
Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief.”19) Such 
unevenness of understanding is to be expected among apprentices. Yet one thing is 
certain: these students adopted the posture of apprenticeship precisely because they 
recognized that studying with Wittgenstein was a craft. 
                                                 
17
 “Can we learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through 
“experience.”—Can someone else be a man’s teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the 
right tip.—This is what “learning” and “teaching” are like here.—What one acquires here is not a technique; 
one learns correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced 
people can apply them right. Unlike calculation rules.” Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe 
and Rush Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), part II.227e. 
18
 Fergus Kerr, “Work on Oneself”: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Psychology, Institute for the 
Psychological Sciences Monograph Series (Arlington, VA: Psychological Sciences Press, 2008), 8. 
19
 Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” 155. 
9 
I want to highlight in particular three marks of contemplative philosophy that 
display its cooperative, progressive and self-involving character as a craft. First, 
contemplative philosophers must learn the self-discipline of resisting the craving for 
general explanation (since generalizing runs the risk of excluding the very differences 
contemplative philosophy aims to elucidate).20 Correlative with the refusal to generalize 
is, second, the insistence that description be done in terms commensurable with the 
thing described. I don’t mean that Wittgenstein objected to using object-language to 
describe cups on tables. I mean rather that since the phenomena under investigation 
involves moves in language games (sentences, gestures, etc.), those who offer descriptions 
of these linguistic moves must work hard to keep their language of description within the 
range of the language they are describing lest an alien language be introduced, one that 
would of course itself require indexing for aptness and so on, ad infinitum.21 
In addition to  the self-involving tasks of submission to a mentor and acquisition of 
the habit of attentive description (while resisting the craving to explain), contemplative 
philosophy is marked, third, by what Phillips called “moral” prerequisite for practicing 
                                                 
20
 “Our disease is one of wanting to explain.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics, ed. G. H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Cambridge, MA and London, UK: MIT Press, 1978), VI §31. The term “craving for generality” was first used 
by Wittgenstein in the Blue Book. The Blue & Brown Books (London: Harper Perennial, 1965), 17. 
21
 Of course, Wittgenstein was the master of conducting contemplative philosophy as an enterprise 
on the same order as the language under investigation. Novice German readers are often surprised to find 
Wittgenstein’s German so easy to read. Evidently Wittgenstein refused to propagate any sentence that 
explains or describes phenomena by means of concepts outside the experience as reported by the human 
subjects themselves. For example, despite all that music meant to Wittgenstein, he consistently resorted to 
silence rather than employ extra-musical concepts to describe music. Wittgenstein’s reticence is often 
frustrating since philosophers are proud of their technical vocabulary which they invent in hopes of 
clarifying the sense of the sentence. But Wittgenstein thought this temptation must be resisted. In the place 
of generalization, one must learn to attend to particulars. For “the limit of language is shown by its being 
impossible to describe the fact which …is the translation of a… sentence, without simply repeating the 
sentence.” Culture and Value, 10e. 
10 
with excellence. In order to do conceptual justice to religious life in all its varieties, 
Phillips recommends contemplative philosophy be done in a “cool place,” one free from 
ideological passion, a freedom in which “philosophical contemplation endeavors to let the 
world be itself in all its variety. It allows the hubbub of voices and their diverse relations 
to each other to be themselves.”22 Lest this recommendation be mistaken for a mere “live 
and let live” policy on the one hand or a hankering after dispassionate, Cartesian 
objectivity on the other, both of which stances Phillips holds to be confused, I propose 
that the “moral requirement” of contemplative philosophy be understood as linked with 
the faculty of skilled judgment that is progressively acquired.  
Novices—of carpentry, of music, of philosophy, of whatever craft—slowly acquire 
skilled judgment through training, and they are aided in this pursuit by the gradual 
mastery of the relevant conceptual language. In fact, conceptual mastery is partially 
constitutive of this skilled judgment. But as Rush Rhees has shown with his classic essay, 
no single domain of discourse is hermetically sealed off from the rest of speaking; at least 
not in real life. When the builders of PI §2 return home from an exhausting day of “Slab!” 
and “Block!” it will be natural for them to use these same expressions when they talk with 
family members about what they did all day. In order for the builders’ simple language 
really to be imaginable as a complete language game, there must be much more to their 
form of life, and how their speaking on the job is related to the rest of their living must be 
                                                 
22
 From the introductory essay of this volume by Phillips. Page 5 in the typescript. 
11 
evident. In other words, the “complete” language game of building cannot be separated 
from the rest of speaking and living without ceasing to be a complete language game.23  
The overlapping character of language games itself contributes to the skill 
development of the novice. Like children, novices learn fluency by clumsy participation in 
conversations in which each conversant brings something to bear on the conversation. 
Sometimes what is brought to bear is tremendously helpful: as human practices are 
constituted by over-lapping domains of discourse, unbidden yet felicitous cross-practice 
transfer of concepts and judgment sometimes happens. In other words, on occasion, a 
practitioner is helped toward skilled judgment in one craft by means of fluency 
painstakingly acquired in an alternate domain of discourse.24 This happy phenomena can 
be illustrated by Wittgenstein’s own example: his contemplative philosophy was assisted 
by his ability to view the world under the aspect of engineering.25 
Apart from a handful of sources, few Wittgensteinians recognize much of value in 
the lingering presence of Wittgenstein’s graduate work in engineering on his 
philosophical investigations. Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin noted that Wittgenstein 
deliberately followed physicist Heinrich Hertz’s use of “modeling” (Darstellung) rather 
than Ernst Mach’s “representation” (Vorstellung) to express world and language as 
                                                 
23
 Rush Rhees, “Wittgenstein’s Builders,” in Discussions of Wittgenstein (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes 
Press, 1996), 71-84. See esp. 75-77. 
24
 On the phenomenon of “cross-domain transfer” of tips from one field into an entirely unrelated 
field (e.g., from bicycling to aeronautics!), see Brad J. Kallenberg, “Cross Domain Transfer and Design,” in 
By Design: Theology, Ethics and the Practice of Engineering (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013), 208-47. 
25
 “Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook,” International 
Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 71, no. 1 (2012): 55-73. 
12 
internally related.26  Raymond Monk, Brian McGuiness, and Bernhard Leitner each note 
Wittgenstein’s prowess in all things mechanical, how he built a working sewing machine 
at age 12, patented a propeller design at age 22, repaired machinery at a local factory when 
he lived in Norway in his early thirties, meticulously designed and oversaw the 
construction of a Bauhaus home for his sister at age 35, and at age 54 built a an apparatus 
for a war-time hospital for recording blood pressure for patients suffering from pulsus 
paradoxus (rapid decline in pulse).27 It is important whether this training conditioned in 
some way Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Kelly Hamilton sees Wittgenstein’s 
engineering training as limited in scope to his Tractarian outlook.28 But Susan Sterrett 
argues most convincingly that Wittgenstein’s engineering training may have had a lasting 
influence also on his later philosophy.29 
                                                 
26
 The latter term, employed by turn-of-the-century scientists like Ernst Mach, presumes language 
and world to be externally related. However, the former term was borrowed from physicist Heinrich Hertz 
who described the way in which (engineering) models of the world could be assessed by a criterion that 
expressed an internal relation between modeler and world. On the criterion of Zweckmäßigkeit see Allan 
Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973), 179-84.  
27
 Examples in chronological order: ibid.; Brian McGuinness, ed. Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 
1889-1921 (Volume 1) (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988); Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: 
The Duty of Genius (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990). Bernhard Leitner, The Architecture of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein : A Documentation, with Excerpts from the Family Recollections by Hermine Wittgenstein 
(London & New York: Academy Editions and St. Martin’s Press, 1995). J. R. Henderson, “Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Guy’s Hospital,” Guys Hospital Reports 122, no. 1-2 (1973): 185-93. 
28
 Kelly Hamilton, “Darstellungen in the Principles of Mechanics and the Tractatus: The 
Representation of Objects in Relation in Hertz and Wittgenstein,” Perspectives on Science 10, no. 1 (2002); 
“Some Philosophical Consequences of Wittgenstein’s Aeronautical Research,” Perspectives on Science 9, no. 
1 (2001); “Wittgenstein and the Mind’s Eye,” in Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy, ed. James C. Klagge 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
29
  Susan G. Sterrett, Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and Models of the World 
(New York: Pi Press, 2006); “Pictures of Sounds: Wittgenstein on Gramophone Records and the Logic of 
Depiction,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 36, no. 2 (2005): 351-62; “Physical Pictures: 
Engineering Models Circa 1914 and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” in History of Philosophy of Science: New 
Trends and Perspectives, ed. Michael Heidelberger and Friedrich Stadler (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2002), 121-35. 
13 
The historical context of Wittgenstein’s turn to philosophy and away from 
engineering at the University of Manchester was the successful solution of heavier-than-
air flight in 1905 (Europe 1908). It is immaterial to my argument whether or not Sterrett is 
correct in her speculation that like many other promising young thinkers, the young 
Wittgenstein had enrolled in aeronautical engineering with dreams of building flying 
machines and that the burden of Wittgenstein’s genius drove him to seek elsewhere for 
an outlet once the Wright Brothers had gotten there first. We do know that in response 
to the two enormous technical problems facing turn-of-the-century aeronautics (namely, 
building a sufficiently light-weight source of power and steering the contraption despite 
aerial instability), Wittgenstein himself contributed to the solution of the first problem by 
designing an innovative propeller with jet-propulsion tips.30 The relevant point is that 
there is evidence that Wittgenstein mastered crucial engineering concept and continued 
to employ them long after he had abandoned aeronautical engineering. The technical 
term “method of projection” is particularly germane; for engineers, the projection from 
model to world passes through the skills of the model-maker. 
The significance of “method of projection” for Wittgenstein is bound up with the 
difference between Darstellung and Vorstellung. This difference can be expressed by a 
simple historical illustration. At the end of the 19th Century, children in France played 
with a toy helicopter designed by Alphonse Pénaud. A similar toy can still be purchased 
                                                 
30
 Patent is dated June, 1911. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, 34. Fuel was pumped to 
a tiny reaction chamber at the tip of each propeller blade. Upon reaction, the jet gas would escape the 
chamber tangential to the rotation of the blade, thus spinning the blade faster. The idea was eventually put 
into practice—years later by Doblhoff in a WWII helicopter and more recently by Fairey’s Jet Gyrodone. 
McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889-1921 (Volume 1), 68-69. 
14 
today. The helicopter’s rotors generate enough speed for lift-off because of the ingenious 
rack-and-pinion gear arrangement: the child pulls the 18-inch strap (rack gear) quickly, 
the rotor turns and lifts the toy, keeping it aloft for flights of 30-40 feet. The toy clearly 
proves that heavier-than-air flight was indeed possible. The trick was how to scale up the 
toy to a life-sized version.31 
Simplistically speaking, the approach of Vorstellung to this problem is to apply a 
method of projection that simply multiplies all the dimensions of the toy by a single 
scalar. If the sitting space of the toy pilot is four inches, and an adult pilot needs four feet 
of cockpit space, a reasonable suggestion is simply to multiply all the dimension by a 
factor of 12. For sake of argument, let us set aside technical problems of steering. And let 
us suppose there is reliable access to unlimited power to pull the strap. Will the thing fly? 
No.  
It is worth the trouble to work through the reasons why not, in order to comprehend 
the categorical difference between Vorstellung and Darstellung. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, flying devices behave differently depending on their size.32 
Fundamental to our hypothetical device is the physics of the problem. Because height, 
length and breadth have each increased twelve-fold, the weight has increased by a factor 
of 123, or 1,728-fold! Since lift is a function of both propeller speed and air density, it is 
important to note that the air into which the chopper is to ascend and which must 
                                                 
31
 Sterrett, Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and Models of the World, 1-17.  
32
 Although she has undervalued the significance of Darstellungen for Wittgenstein, a concept he 
learned from Heinrich Hertz, I’m indebted to Susan Sterrett’s careful discussion of “method of projection.” 
See ibid., 155-253. 
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support the lift of the propellers has not increased density between the toy and the 
machine. This means that the copter must increase its own lift by a factor of 1,728, 
presumably by increased rotor speed alone. However, here the proposed enlargement 
runs up against physical limits of materials. The strength of moving parts—propeller, 
shaft, gear strap—is proportional to the cross-sectional area of the part. If length and 
breadth have each increased twelve-fold, the strength of the enlarged parts has increased 
122 or 144 times, because the cross-sectional area, by definition, can increase in only two 
dimensions. Consequently, this is very likely to fail, since the most strength we can build 
into the enlarged parts falls short of the additional required lift by a factor of 12!  
Instinctively, engineers know that the Vorstellung approach—a modeling-by-
proportionality—is doomed to fail.33 The only “method of projection” that might possibly 
satisfy the design problem is one in which the model is skillfully varied according to 
conditions of the problem. This method of projection is a function of human experience, 
savvy, and know-how and corresponds to the concept of engineering design or modeling 
called Darstellung. In everyday German, one attends the cinema to see a film “presented” 
(vorstellen) but attends live theater to see a play “presented” (darstellen). The difference is 
clear: a Vorstellung is the same every time regardless of who runs the projector. By 
contrast, a Darstellung of a play varies, sometimes wildly, depending upon the actors, 
director, and many other features of context.  
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Wittgenstein seems to have had something like Hertz’s notion of Darstellung in 
mind when in Tractatus 4.0141 he wrote: 
There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the 
symphony from the score….And that rule is the law of projection which 
projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. 
We seriously misread this passage if we take the terms “general rule” and “law of 
projection” to express the analogy-by-proportion of Vorstellung. That is to say, not just 
anyone can listen to a symphony and write out the musical score! However, it may be 
possible for very skillful musicians to do so. Yet we must not for a moment pretend that 
all there is to musical transcription is working through the one-to-one correspondence 
between notes played and the score. After all, there are computer programs that can do 
that. By contrast, it also matters crucially to a given performance of a Schumann piece 
that the composer wrote the command  “Wie aus weiter Ferne” (“Play as if from far away”) 
rather than simply “pianissimo” (“Play softly”).34 Of course, I have no idea what the 
difference between the two commands is, for I am not a skilled musician. But I’m told by 
musicians that “storied” instructions really do matter for performance, and, likewise, 
narrative phrases akin to the one used by Schumann, are equally crucial for accurate 
transcription of Schumann’s music performed faithfully. In short, the “projection” of the 
performance onto a newly transcribed score is internally related to the skill of the 
musician who is doing the transcription. Only in this way is the performance “analogous” 
to the score. But this is analogy-as-skilled-use and decidedly not analogy-as-proportion. 
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How then does Wittgenstein call this projection a “law?” Only in the sense that 
musical convention is regularized, for the craft of music is conventional by nature.35 The 
projection is not a “law” in the sense that what to do could be specified in advance 
(according to the “law”). Rather, skilled musicians are progressively trained—by intensive 
participation in the cooperative practice under the watchful eye of a mentor—into a 
particular set of conventions surrounding musical notation and performance that can be 
discerned in the play of the experts. This training amounts to habituation in both tacit 
and verbal know-how.  
How then is this a “general rule?” It may be illuminating to read this phrase also as 
an expression of the regularized training that musicians receive. The rule in view, 
therefore,  is not a one-size-fits-all fiat but rather an iterative training regimen, perhaps 
akin to “The Rule of St. Benedict.” Thus we might speak of The Rule of Julliard or the Rule 
of The London Conservatory of Music. 
The Tractarian passage goes on to assert that an orchestra’s performance can also be 
“projected” onto a gramophone groove. Like the musical score, the projection onto a 
gramophone disc happens by means human know-how, though in this case it is not the 
skills of the musician in view, but of the skill of the engineers. This raises an interesting 
question. Is the law of projection of symphony onto score the “same” as the law of 
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projection of symphony onto gramophone? Here Sterrett claims the German is unclear.36 
But on closer consideration the answer seems clear enough: it cannot be the same law of 
projection, because the “Rule of Julliard” is not the same as the “Rule of MIT.” These two 
disparate training regimens do, however, become coterminous in the case of a Schumann 
sonata captured on CD. More importantly, they also become coterminous in the case of 
the single individual who learns mastery of both disciplines. The mystery of the unclear 
German dissolves in view of the fact that Wittgenstein, being highly trained in both music 
and engineering, instinctively assumed that the projections might pass through a single 
dually-trained individual, namely L.W. 37 
Music never lost its grip on Wittgenstein’s thinking. He wondered if persons 
untrained in music could fully grasp his views on language: “It is impossible for me to say 
in my book one word about all that music has meant in my life. How then can I hope to 
be understood?”38 It is my contention that Wittgenstein never lost his engineer’s eye any 
more than he lost his musical ear. Just before writing the Investigations, he composed a 
book that, though never published in his lifetime, made it as far as a typed manuscript 
known as the Big Typescript. In it he criticized a proposed design for an efficient engine, 
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quite possibly suggested to him by his father who hankered after perpetual motion 
gismos: 
 
A perpetual motion engine?39 
 
While this device can be debunked by building a prototype, to the one who is trained 
according to the “rule of engineering” the device can be simply and instantly seen as rigid. 
(That is to say, either the axel joint (A) is rigid and nothing moves or the axel joint is 
revolute and everything moves independently of the wheel.40 In either case, the piston 
does no work.) Not every layperson can see this, though some can. Yet mechanical 
engineers naturally see it, for they are trained to see the world under the aspect of 
kinematics. I’ll admit that the concept of “aspect-seeing” supplements and in large 
measure replaces some of the engineering motifs in Wittgenstein’s later writings. 
However, throughout the corpus Wittgenstein repeatedly drew attention to physical 
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“training,” which is so central to crafts such as engineering, music, and philosophy of 
language. 
Under what circumstances pointing can explain, i.e., convey the use of a word. 
Not to a baby. It learns by being drilled.41 
I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so 
react….I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post in so far as 
there is a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.42 
By nature and by particular training, a particular education, we are disposed to 
give spontaneous expression to wishes in certain circumstances….In this game 
the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot 
arise at all…If I have learned to talk, then I do know.43 
That the notion of bodily training persists in Wittgenstein’s thinking makes the following 
question worth asking: To what extent was Wittgenstein’s non-contemplative behavior—
from his eating habits to his prayer life—internally related to his philosophical method? 
In other words, did Wittgenstein naturally assume that there was a bodily prerequisite for 
doing contemplative philosophy well? If so, this fact might make his outlook similar to 
medieval monks who practiced rigorous asceticism in order to achieve spiritual insight 
and know-how.44  
The possibility, however remote, that some of Wittgenstein’s non-contemplative 
behavior may be internally related to his method may shed light on what sort of “moral” 
requirement might be demanded by contemplative philosophy. On the one hand, the odd 
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bits of his biography (giving away his fortune, etc.) may be evidence of nothing more than 
the sort of eccentricity that sometimes accompanies genius. If that is the case, we can 
conclude nothing about the hypothesized connection between conduct and philosophy. 
On the other hand, perhaps Wittgenstein, in strong contrast to modern philosophers, yet 
in striking similarity to pre-modern philosophical theologians, felt the importance of 
bodily discipline for achieving clarity.45 
Raymond Monk reports Wittgenstein underwent something like a religious 
conversion while serving the Austrian army on the Russian front. The catalyst for this 
experience was his discovery of Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief, and for a time, Wittgenstein was 
referred to as “the man with the Gospels.”46 This period in Wittgenstein’s life can be 
characterized in terms of monastic-like vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. 
Immediately upon return from the front, Wittgenstein gave away his share of his father’s 
vast fortune—Karl Wittgenstein was the Rockefeller of Europe—and for a time lived in as 
ascetic conditions as could be imagined, working as a gardener and sleeping in the tool 
shed.47 In addition to self-imposed poverty, Wittgenstein’s diaries show that he 
considered sexual release to be a detrimental to intellectual rigor. Finally, Wittgenstein 
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kept a rigorous diet–Malcolm reports that lunch consisted of a single boiled egg—and a 
strict schedule. As Wittgenstein aged he devoted increasing amounts of time to prayer 
though, predictably, he thought he prayed badly.48 But he recommended prayer to others 
by giving to Drury, Malcolm and others, copies of Dr. Samuel Johnson’s Prayers and 
Meditations. Perhaps most surprising of all, he initiated with G.E. Moore a plan to read 
together St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. As Kerr notes, they soon gave it up. But “that 
they even tried boggles the mind.”49 
Suggestive though theses biographical details may be, my point is not that 
Wittgenstein was himself a religious character who thereby falsified a general prohibition 
against occupying a theological perspective. My point in rehearsing these biographical 
details is only to alert us to the fact that Wittgenstein presumed that what one did with 
one’s body is very, very important to one’s work as a philosopher. Particularly germane to 
my argument is the fact that, forever in search of illuminating comparisons, Wittgenstein 
instinctively gleaned conceptual insight from those disciplines for which fluency cannot 
be separated from bodily training.50 Clearly this is the case for music. And it is the case for 
engineering. Consequently, it is plausible that there may be other disciplines which 
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resemble Wittgensteinian philosophy for the way conceptual fluency and bodily conduct 
are tightly paired. Did Phillips see this? It does not appear so. Phillips explicitly states that 
the radical pluralism entailed by contemplative philosophy  cannot be any ideological 
perspective. Yet, pace Phillips, I will next show the way in which a certain sort of 
theological craft circumvents his fears.51 But the conditions are twofold. First, a single 
practitioner must be fluent in both modes of discourse (i.e., both philosophy and 
theology); it is under the skin of the “bilingual” practitioner that the boundary between 
contemplative philosophy and theology may be thought to be semi-permeable. Second, as 
“theological” doesn’t name a unitary perspective, of the wide variety of modes of 
theological discourse, the bilingual practitioner must restrict him or herself to that mode 
of theological discourse that comports with the radical pluralism said to be entailed by 
the contemplative philosophical outlook. 
 
THE BILINGUAL PRACTITIONER 
My intention in the preceding section has been to make plausible the possibility that 
contemplative philosophy is a craft practiced by human animals who cannot help but do 
so in an embodied manner. Consequently, it is plausible to test contemplative philosophy 
against what we know about the bodily nature of other crafts. If Wittgenstein himself 
undertook philosophical therapy by means of discourse borrowed from music and 
engineering, it is at least logically possibly that contemplative philosophy may, under 
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some conditions, finds resonance with discourse borrowed from still other non-
philosophical crafts. If engineering and music are two crafts that resonate with 
contemplative philosophy, then it is at least logically possible that theology might be a 
third. Of course, it is easy to show that some forms of theological discourse mutually 
exclude contemplative philosophy—for example, evidentialist apologetics. On this I fully 
agree with Phillips. But if we attend to a broader and longer history of what the craft 
called “theology” has amounted to, we will discover that there is a way to see 
contemplative philosophy as coming very close to that which some strands of theology 
have set as their own task.52 I close this first section by offering two examples of theology-
laden discourse that comes near to contemplative philosophy.  
In a new book, one incidentally dedicated to the memory of D. Z. Phillips, 
Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams writes appreciatively on the thought of 
Simone Weil.53 The essay entitled “Simone Weil and the Necessary Non-Existence of God” 
deserves far more thoughtful treatment than space here allows. I should not mention the 
essay were it not for the striking fact that Williams sees apophatic theology in very strong 
resonance with Weil’s view that “God is found only in the experience of divine absence.”54 
To the extent that Phillips has himself repeatedly drawn upon Weil’s comprehensive 
vision in his own thinking, it is difficult to imagine Phillips denying that similarities exist 
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between his and Williams’ conclusions.55 Nor could Phillips have maintained that when 
Williams writes on Weil, Williams is doing either contemplative philosophy or doing 
theology but not both! Rather, Williams is simultaneously a practitioner of both crafts.56 
That much seems obvious. 
The tendency to strictly divide disciplines within the humanities is, historically 
speaking, a relatively recent phenomenon that has not been entirely beneficial to either 
philosophy or theology. The sort of  interconnections between disciplines cross-craft 
transfer of skills alluded to above has a poignant illustration in the contrast between René 
Descartes and Blaise Pascal. Both were expert practitioners of mathematics. For his part, 
Descartes was also a philosopher. He invents and posits Cartesian space, a handy 
convention that helped to give birth to the notion of “objectivity.” However, some aspects 
of his mathematics end up being hobbled by his epistemology: he is unable to solve the 
problem of the cycloid (the scalloped loop traced by a point on the edge of a coin as it 
rolls across a table; see Fig 1).  
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Figure 1 Cycloid path 
 
In Descartes’s mind, in order for a curve to be “properly geometrical,” it must be “that 
which can be grasped by the intellect in a single intuition, or by a chain of intuitively 
certain consequences.”57 For Descartes, the only curves which passed muster were 
arithmetic-algebraic forms, which is to say, curves that were describable by finite 
mathematics. Interestingly, Descartes’ considerable mathematical abilities were 
hamstrung by a philosophical outlook that bifurcated (a) subjects from objects, (b) 
elegant geometry from “brute mechanicals” (such as the cycloid), and (c) the finite from 
the infinite. Because he could not conceive the problem, much less solve it algebraically, 
Descartes was forced to dismiss the cycloid as “beneath” geometry.58 
Pascal, Descartes’ countryman, did not share Descartes’s allergy to “brute 
mechanicals.” Granted, Pascal too was a dualist. But unlike Descartes, Pascal did not pit 
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the material against the immaterial, nor the finite against the infinite. Rather, the polar 
opposite of the infinite was the “nothingness.” The realm of the finite, material and 
contingent was suspended in the middle, on the one side borrowing its being from the 
infinite and, on the other side, inheriting its imperfections from the nothingness by 
participating in both. Historian of science Douglas Jesseph summarized: 
The foundation of Pascal’s approach to the cycloid, and indeed to geometry 
generally, is therefore the notion that a finite magnitude hangs, as it were, 
suspended between nothingness and the infinite, participating in both. As a 
result, there is no epistemological barrier to the use of infinitesimal quantities. 
These, it seems, are as easily comprehended as any other geometric objects, 
and there is no difficulty in assuming that a finite quantity can be divided into 
an infinite collection of infinitesimal parts, that these parts can be summed up 
in an infinite collection, and yet this collection adds up to a finite magnitude.59 
Where did Pascal get this idea? From theology. In his essay on geometry, “De l’Esprit 
géométrique,” Pascal paraphrases the Latin text of Wisdom 11:20(21), “But you have 
arranged all things by measure and number and weight.”60 This may not sound like much, 
but Pascal sees these terms—distance, number and movement (weight), and by means of 
them space and time—as grasped by intuition since humans, as created beings, are 
naturally endowed with faculties fit for navigating the rest of creation. As a result, Pascal 
has no trouble expanding the discipline of mathematics to embrace not only arithmetic 
and geometry but also “mechanics.”61 Comprehending mechanicals required 
infinitesimals. But Pascal was not as cautious as Descartes. Why was Pascal so daring? 
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Pascal was daring because humans and mechanicals together are suspended in the middle 
participating in both the nothingness and the infinite. 
This is a theological perspective. (It is sometimes called “sacramentalism.”) Pascal 
used to place an empty chair to the side of his writing desk in order to remind himself of 
his own contingency; at any moment he might fall into nothingness.62 On the other side, 
diametrically opposed to the nothingness, his desk opened up to a world shot through 
with the perichoretic fecundity of God’s presence from which all things borrow their 
existence. This seemingly trivial physical arrangement of his study space was Pascal’s way 
of sustaining his bodily habit of seeing the material order (including himself) under the 
aspect of sacramentality, which is to say, seeing everything that was created as permeated 
by infinitude. 
It is anybody’s guess as to why Descartes missed it. My point is that Pascal saw the 
world differently than Descartes, because Pascal saw it sacramentally. While Pascal’s 
outlook may not be shared by many philosophers of religion today, the practical upshot 
was this: Pascal’s invention of a precursor to infinitesimal calculus that applied to 
everyday brute mechanicals such as the cycloid was predicated on his ability to “see” the 
world under the aspect of sacramentality, which for Pascal meant seeing the simultaneous 
double participation of all things in the nothingness and in the infinity of God. I am not 
claiming that sacramentality needs to be a metaphysical tenet (though it surely was for 
Pascal) in order for it to serve as an aspect under which the problem could be viewed and 
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thereby be solved.63 My point is that Pascal’s theology enabled him to see the movement 
of a coin under the aspect of sacramentality, to “see” the infinite as permeating all things. 
It was this seeing that rewarded Pascal’s eschewal of Cartesian bifurcations and, pace 
Descartes, to presume that this brute mechanical world could be described as the real 
presence of the infinite in the finite (i.e., by infinitesimal calculus). Ironically, we now 
teach infinitesimal calculus inside Cartesian space. And though we, like Pascal, can solve 
the problem of the cycloid, we have grown unaware of the religious point of view that 
initially made this solution possible. 
 
THE GRAMMAR OF “THEOLOGY” 
The preceding section argued the first move of my argument, namely, that 
contemplative philosophy is a human craft that, like all crafts, is constituted not by a self-
contained mode of discourse but by overlapping modes of discourse. As a result, 
contemplative philosophy must in principle remain open theological modes of discourse 
or else it will suffer collapse under its own doctrinaire exclusions. Of course, not every 
instance of theological discourse may overlap with contemplative philosophy. So I turn 
now to the second move in my argument, namely a description of the kind of theology 
that might comport with contemplative philosophy. 
In an essay entitled, “Internal Realism,” Finnish systematic theologian Tage Kurtén 
tries unsuccessfully to demonstrate conceptual common ground between Phillips and 
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existentialist theologian, Paul Tillich.64 Phillips concludes his strong rebuff of Kurtén by 
recounting three comforting but faulty pictures that theologians wrongheadedly employ 
in hopes of protecting religion from the impending danger entailed by the fact that 
certain modes of religious conduct are disappearing (or have already disappeared) from 
contemporary Western culture. Religious individualism is the picture that, regardless of 
the fate of religion in the external culture, so long as the lone religious believer is rightly 
related to his or her personal divine Savior, religious belief is garrisoned ad intra 
hominis—on the interior of the person. The second illusory comforting picture is called 
religious rationalism. It protects religious belief by asserting, “No matter what cultural 
challenges may take place, the validity of religious beliefs is secured by formal arguments 
which transcend the relativity of cultural contexts.”65 The third faulty picture, religious 
accommodation, describes Christianity as a religion constituted by a never-ending 
response to questions posed by surrounding culture and to which religion supposedly has 
the answer. “Therefore,” according to this view, “whatever changes in our culture, 
however dark it becomes for certain religious traditions, Christianity can always 
accommodate the situation by taking on new cultural forms….”66 
The ubiquity of these apologetic pictures in contemporary theology is undisputable. 
However, these defensive measures do not exhaust the number of possible modes 
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theology may take. Nor does theology, in the end, reduce to playing defense. A hint of 
what I mean comes from Phillips’s own report of a conversation between Rhees and 
Wittgenstein. 
I will mention…a remark Wittgenstein made to me after a talk Farrington had 
given to our Philosophical Society. Farrington spoke on “Causality in History,” 
in which he advanced some version of the Marxian “dialectic,” with the idea 
that this shows that in the course of history there is “progress on the whole.” In 
the discussion Wittgenstein showed easily enough the incoherence of 
Farrington’s discourse. And when he was walking home with me afterwards he 
said how he disliked this kind of “optimism” which was supposed to result from 
the demonstration (from a theory of history, or of how history must go). “If a 
man says ‘Certainly things look bad at the moment; and if you look at past 
history, you can find plenty that might lead anyone to be depressed. But in 
spite of all that, I am still optimistic.’ — then I can admire this, even if I do not 
agree with him. But if his optimism is just the outcome of a scientific proof — 
the scientific study of history — then…” That seemed to Wittgenstein a weak 
and mealy-mouthed sort of optimism, I think; and one with a sort of smugness 
to it. It was not really facing the problem it pretended to face; it was painting it 
over.67 
While Wittgenstein was describing an imaginary individual in the above example, it is 
hard to take seriously Wittgenstein envisioning any lone optimist without also 
envisioning him or her as sustained by some particular community or other. I might then 
reasonably ask: What might this community look like? And, shifting away from a 
scientistic optimist to a religious one, I might also ask: What kind of practices, habits, and 
speech sustains a community whose members are marked by religious belief “come what 
may?” For that matter, what sort of community of discourse produces martyrs? 
Answering these questions is admittedly not a philosophical task. And I will not 
undertake answers here, except to note that the three illusory pictures that Phillips 
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 Cited in “Philosophy and Theology — Too Close for Comfort. A Reply to Tage Kurtén,” 123-24. 
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describes may—although there are no guarantees—may be avoided by the kind of 
community that gives priority to first-order religious speech over second-order 
theological explanation.68 For example, religious individualism might possibly be avoided 
by the community who consistently prays in the first person plural (“Our Father…”) 
rather than in the first person singular (“my Father….”). Religious rationalism may be 
avoided to the extent that Wittgenstein’s parenthetical phrase, “theology as grammar,”69 
is descriptive of the enterprise that shows rather than says what religious belief amounts 
to. Conversely, communities whose first-order religious speech and practice is easily 
supplanted by explanations constructed in alien vocabulary and grammar is perennially 
vulnerable to bewitchment by these pictures.70 
Finally, religious accommodation may be avoided by the community capable of 
“witness.” Witness is not the same as apologetics. The speech act called apologetics 
(apologia) is a relatively infrequent term in the canonical scriptures. It is overshadowed 
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 Three paragraphs into his eighteenth lecture, William James describes theological formulations as 
“secondary products, like translations of a text into another tongue.” As such, theology and philosophy are 
dependent upon primary products of religion, which for James is religious feeling. Although he clearly 
admired James, Wittgenstein identified religious practice (including speech) as primary, rather than 
religious feelings. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, The Modern Library (New York: 
Random House, 1902), 422. While it is commonplace to think of theology as something that happens later, 
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community talks about. Consequently, there is no neat dividing line between theological speech and 
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 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 373. 
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 Perhaps the following story can shed some light. An agnostic friend of mine, also a former student 
of Phillips, once remarked that when I prayed it sounded as though I “believed God to be ontologically real 
in the metaphysical sense,” something my friend was eager to fault. My reply frustrated him: “Ontologically 
real?” “Metaphysical sense? Why do you think that these terms make my belief clearer than what we 
Christians actually say? We say things such as “God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself.” My 
refusal to leave the realm of ordinary language had the effect of depriving my friend of the leverage he 
thought he had against religious belief. And to that extent I suppose it functioned as a kind of defense. But 
in all sincerity I was only trying to remain consistent with the lesson I learned from Phillips, that analysis 
must be conducted in the same genre as the sentences under investigation. 
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by witness (euangelizō) and preaching (kērygma) by a margin of eight to one. Initially, 
apologetics was a speech act reserved for special situations, namely, after one had been 
arrested and required to give an account before civil authorities. By “witness” is meant all 
acts of communicating the Good News (euangelion) that are isomorphic with the manner 
in which Jesus of Nazareth lived and communicated. (Obviously, this is tricky; witness is 
a craft in its own right.) But note: religious accommodation is avoided because witness, 
unlike apologetics, does not require translation of first-order claims into terms the target 
culture already understands. The point of witness is enculturation. By “enculturation” I 
mean that a community shows what they are saying by bearing out in deeds isomorphic 
with their speech. Witness cannot be accomplished by translation because word-for-word 
same saying ignores the behavioral backdrop of our words.71 When my friend John moved 
to Ecuador to live among the Quechua, no amount of reading English translations would 
do the trick! His first order of business was learning to speak Quechan as they speak it. All 
that goes into the manner in which the Quechua speak Quechan constitutes the pattern 
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 “…a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make 
sense.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §257. A given speech-act has the meaning it does by 
word-use-in-context. One can subvert what one intends to say by ill-matched behavior. The two-timing cad 
cannot say “I love you” and mean the same as the lifelong, faithfully monogamous partner. So too, the 
warrior who cries “Christ alone is the Prince of Peace!” while cleaving the skull of the infidel is our of sync 
with the community that takes the title “Prince of Peace” as an appellation of Jesus’ pacifism. On the 
relation of pacifism and witness see the culminating Gifford Lecture by Stanley Hauerwas printed as ch. 6 of 
Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology: Being Gifford 
Lectures Delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 2001 (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001). 
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John “must” master in order to communicate. And of course that “pattern” necessarily 
includes non-verbal patterns of behavior.72 There is a parallel in Wittgenstein: 
When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language 
of the every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we 
want to say? Then how is another to be constructed?—And how strange that 
we should be able to do anything with the one we have.73 
If theologians are disciplined enough to keep their reflection isomorphic with first-order 
religious language (akin to the way Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language is isomorphic 
with ordinary language), then such theologians belonging to the “come what may” 
community learn a craft that is naturally loathe to transgress the marks of contemplative 
philosophy precisely because they are loathe to transgress the boundaries of first-order 
speaking. To say the same thing differently, Wittgensteinian theologians maintain that 
the way to “go on” begins with the assumption that religion, theology, and philosophy of 
religion share a first-order (ordinary) grammar. This is not to deny that each of these 
disciplines may have their respective technological terminology. But for Wittgenstein, 
importantly, technical terms depend for their very sense upon first-order language. What 
is sought by theologians of this stripe, then, is neither explanation nor justification, 
neither accommodation nor apologetics, but skilled first-order use. And part of this 
skilled-use is knowing when advocacy and explanation come to an end. I turn finally to an 
attempt to make clear with a concrete example of theology in action. 
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resisted the temptation to invent a philosophical language (as did Tarksi and others). 
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 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, §77. Also §27: “The calculus is as it were autonomous.—
Language must speak for itself.” 
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Theology after Wittgenstein  
Consider the ordinary, if astonishing, appellation, “Christ is God.” Clear attestations 
of Christ’s divinity show up in very early Christian worship. There is no sense pretending 
that there is a nifty solution to the seeming contradiction entailed by the claims that “God 
is one,” “The Father is not the Son,” and “Christ is God.” Nor is there a point in reducing 
the claim “Christ is God” to something as mundane as “Jesus is really swell.” For, were 
there an acceptable way to dodge the problem of Christian worship of Christ as God, the 
Church could have avoided several tumultuous centuries of excommunicating those 
whose proffered explanations were deemed as not going on in the same way, not to 
mention avoid three centuries of executions at the hands of those who insisted religious 
loyalty to Caesar trumps worship of Jesus the Christ.  
One of the earliest written claims is rendered doxologically by St. Paul, “…the one 
being Christ according to the flesh who is, above all, God!”74  Contemporary Christians, 
who unblinkingly affirm the intelligibility of this sentence, may do so inappropriately  or 
appropriately, and the difference between them is exactly the difference Wittgenstein 
makes for doing theology in a contemplative manner. In the first case are those 
theologians (and philosophers of religion) who approach St. Paul’s words under one or 
more of the following assumptions: (a) This is surely a “metaphysical” claim; moreover (b) 
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 The Greek construction is crystal clear: hōn ho Christos to kata sarka, hōn epi pantōn theos (w{n o( 
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are Jn 1;1; 1:18; 20:28; Titus 2:13; 2 Pe. 1:1; 1 Jn 5:20; Heb 1:8-9, Gal 2:20 (variant ms.). 
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this is a labeling claim that is either true or false in the label it affixes; and possibly going 
further, (c) the veracity of this label must be decided on grounds other than first-order 
religious speech (say putative analytical or historical grounds, etc.). 
Central to this first group’s strategy is the unwritten and (to them) self-evident 
assumption that the copulative “is” expresses identity. “Identity is a precise conception,” 
wrote a presumptive Bertrand Russell, “and no word in ordinary speech stands for 
anything so precise.”75 When one assumes that the word “is” functions in a perfectly clear 
and obvious way, then when one meets puzzles of the form “a is b,” it is easy to conclude 
that such puzzles are best solved by defining or explaining the two terms a, b. Garth 
Hallett describes how, apart from Wittgenstein’s help, this story has gone: 
To the query “How can a possibly be b?” theologians have responded by 
carefully defining, distinguishing, and comparing a and b, critics have replied 
by applying “Leibniz’s law” (the indiscernibility of identicals) and challenging 
the theologians’ solutions, and the faithful have responded by either accepting 
the apparent contradiction (such, they may believe, are the requirements of 
faith) or losing their faith (such may appear the requirements of reason) or 
leaving the whole matter to the experts and simply living with the mystery.76 
Well-intentioned as they may be, theologians of the first group by the very shape of their 
advocacy, have mucked up the works. But there is another way. 
The second alternative follows ordinary language in refusing the univocity of “is.” 
The word “is” is a word in ordinary language and whose enormous range of appropriate 
use must be learned like that of any other word: by using the word in a wide variety of 
ways in a broad range of situations. Either to lump or to restrict this variety begets 
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confusion. Thus the following sentences, each of which employ “is,” are entirely 
befuddling so long as “is” is taken as strict identity.77 
 The rose is red. 
 This is my brother (pointing to a picture). 
 Olivier is Hamlet (in the movie). 
 The evening star is the morning star. 
 Ignorance is bliss. 
 War is war. 
 Life is a bowl of cherries 
As Wittgenstein pointed out, “The words ‘the rose is red’ are meaningless if the word ‘is’ 
has the meaning ‘is identical with’.”78 Of course the word “is” does not in this case have 
the meaning of “is identical with.” But English speakers already know this.  
It would take very little thought to extend the above list indefinitely. And in each 
case the average person understands; persons of average fluency are capable of adapting 
well enough to each new usage of “is” because extending words into new contexts is part 
of what Stephen Mulhall (following Cavell) calls the inherent projectability of language.79 
Fluent speakers are sometimes successful in extending familiar words into new contexts. 
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 The illustrations are Hallett’s, although Hallett appears to be saying that “Christ is God” in the 
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 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 175. 
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 The fourth  of Mulhall’s Stanton Lectures at Cambridge (17 Feb 2014, “Analogical Uses and the 
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38 
Some attempts may be better or worse than others, and the conversation will flourish or 
founder accordingly. But here is the point: Sentences of the form “a is b” are not 
understood by means of a strategy that precisely defines a and b, but by reading each 
occurrence of “is” extensionally, a reading that is accomplished by means of a method of 
projection that passes through the skill (fluency) of the speaker.80 What then of the “is” in 
first-order religious utterances such as “God is love” or, our present puzzle, “Christ is 
God?” Theologians operating in this second mode, neither define nor explain. Yet that 
does not leave them with nothing to do. They seek to read the “is” extensionally. They 
articulate where the riddle lies.81 They elucidate patterns in ambiguous data and help 
others see under one aspect rather than another. They intervene in wrongheaded or 
confused claims en route to showing how the conversation might go on. And they may 
creatively project non-metaphorical analogies into new contexts. Such would be the 
theological grammarians whose own speaking is itself part of the complicated life lived 
together with other believers in the religious community. Simply put, theology after 
Wittgenstein amounts to language tutorials, literary criticism, and poetry practice for 
those who want to appreciate Christian religion for what it is and intelligibly join in, and 
extend, the conversation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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 The term “analogical” is too freighted to be useful in many contexts. The problem in the 
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If attunement to contingency—the contingency that is bound up with the sheer 
physicality and timefulness of human experience—is at the heart of contemplative 
philosophy, then my seemingly innocuous and unobjectionable proposal is that our 
physicality and timefulness imply that contemplative philosophy is itself but one of a host 
of habit-forming and progressive crafts. Detractors may object that I have painted myself 
into a corner. For does not Wittgenstein’s self-descriptive claim (“a philosopher is not a 
member of any community of ideas”) naturally become normative for apprentices who 
are intent on imitating Wittgenstein? Likewise, has not Phillips, himself a second 
generation Wittgensteinian, claimed that contemplative philosophy is part of a radical 
pluralism that in the end simply cannot be a theological perspective? 
Perhaps surprisingly, I have argued to the contrary that neither Wittgenstein’s 
“exile” nor Phillips’s assertion are general prohibitions against theology per se. I concede 
that both may function as excellent training heuristics that will enable apprentice 
theologians to learn the trade more expertly than if the heuristics are ignored.82 But part 
and parcel of mastering a craft is learning to correctly judge when craft-constituting 
heuristics are provisional. Piano instructors drill students early on “never, ever cross your 
hands when playing piano!” (Student cross hands to cover lack of dexterity of the weak 
hands.) Only when pupils have learned this habit thoroughly will they be able, with 
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theoretical aspects of their craft according to skills of practical reasoning. In Koen’s apt phrase, “to be 
human is to be an engineer” (58). 
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trepidation, to progress to the level of skill that is commensurate with cases where hand-
crossing is partly constitutive of expertise. 
In light of human crafts, then, I’ve argued that there are two conditions under which 
a practitioner of contemplative philosophy may possibly find themselves entering 
uncharted theological territory. First, it is possible for the boundary between the two 
crafts to become semi-permeable when a single person approaches fluency in both crafts, 
the craft of contemplative philosophy and the craft of theology. Should cross-discourse 
transfer of conceptual skill occur, it need not nullify the particularities of either craft.83 
(Thus Rowan Williams and Pascal.) Moreover, I have conceded that there are times when 
the prohibition may prove useful for rooting out “uncontemplative” forms of theology 
(e.g., apologetics). Yet I maintain that there is a variety of theological discourse that is not 
by nature tilted agonistically against Wittgenstein’s method. It is this family of theological 
discourse (what Fergus Kerr called “theology after Wittgenstein”) that comports with 
contemplative philosophy. The theologian who restricts him- or herself to this mode of 
theological discourse, while meeting with silence apologia and explanation exemplifies 
the second leg of my argument. I conclude that the budding theologian may become a 
contemplative philosopher and as a contemplative philosopher may discover that the 
craft of philosophy from time to time involves a certain sort of theological perspective. 
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